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PREVENTIVE WAR AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
Jules Lobel*
In September 2002, as the Bush administration was gearing up for a
showdown with Iraq, the White House released its National Security Strategy,
which announced a radical shift in American military policy.1  The United
States had previously adhered doctrinally, if not always in practice, to the
international rule that a nation may unilaterally launch a military attack
against another nation only in strict self-defense, that is, in response to an
armed attack or an imminent threat of an armed attack.2  Any other use of
military force requires approval of the United Nations (“U.N.”) Security
Council, which must first find that a “threat to the peace, breach of peace, or
act of aggression” exists, and then must authorize the use of force to remove
that threat.3  The 2002 National Security Strategy maintained that the threat
of catastrophic attacks with weapons of mass destruction by rogue states
and/or terrorists demands a new, preemptive approach.4  The new doctrine
insisted that unilateral recourse to war is justified not only to forestall
imminent attacks, but to preempt non-imminent threats where the threats are
large enough.5  The United States led invasion of Iraq was widely viewed as
the first test of this preemptive war doctrine.
The legality of the Iraq war and the administration’s preemptive war
doctrine has been hotly debated.  Thousands of pages have been written in law
reviews discussing whether the war was legally justified under the U.N.
Charter (the “Charter”) or under customary international law.6  The legal
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debate has focused on questions of whether international law permits
unilateral recourse to war to forestall non-imminent threats where the threats
are large enough, and whether the Iraq invasion was legally authorized by
prior Security Council resolutions.
Virtually ignored by legal scholars in this debate is the substantial history
of European warfare launched to preempt perceived gathering threats and the
lengthy post-Cold War discussion among United States policymakers as to the
advisability of the United States launching preventive wars against the Soviet
Union or other communist states.7  The absence of this history from the legal
discourse on the Iraq war seems curious, for international law scholars often
turn to historical precedent to interpret legal norms.  Perhaps the explanation
lies in the nature of this history of preventive war thinking, in which leaders
have considered the advisability of the resort to war rather than its legality, an
inquiry which might be thought best left for political scientists or historians,
not lawyers.  Typically, international legal scholars focus their analysis of
history on a fairly narrow search for precedents where governments act upon
and articulate their view of the relevant law, rather than governmental debates
over the efficacy of particular policies.8  Therefore, it is not surprising that the
two examples of preventive use of force relied on in recent legal discourse, the
1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and President Kennedy’s
quarantine during the Cuban Missile Crisis, are those where states invoked
their interpretation of the Charter’s legal regime involving use of force.9
Yet the lengthy history in Europe and the United States of preventive war
thinking seems highly relevant to a discussion of the administration’s main
justification for its preventive war doctrine:  it will make us and the world
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safer.  Undoubtedly, the administration’s doctrine fits uncomfortably within
the current legal regime regulating resort to war, and most international law
scholars, most nations of the world, and the U.N. General Secretary Kofi Anan
viewed the Iraq war as illegal.10  Nonetheless, administration supporters argue
that the U.N. Charter’s rules do not provide the United States with security
against nations we claim are “rogue states.”11  While the Charter and
customary international law mandate that a nation not unilaterally use armed
force unless it is attacked or at least is facing an imminent threat of attack,
President Bush has stated that we must act before threats are “fully formed,”12
for “if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.”13
Therefore, the administration argues that we must either discard or radically
alter the traditional imminence requirement of customary international law to
allow a nation to use force in self-defense when it believes a high likelihood
of future attack exists, even if the perceived attack is not temporally
imminent.14  The administration claims that we can no longer rely on the
defensive postures of the past which comported with the traditional
requirements of international law because deterrence does not work against
rogue states.  “Containment is not possible,” proclaimed President Bush at
West Point in 2002, “when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass
destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to
terrorist allies.”15
The administration’s arguments that national security requires that we not
wait for gathering dangers to materialize, but use force preemptively to
forestall a future attack echoes arguments made by government and military
leaders throughout history in a variety of strategic environments.16  While
these arguments were made in different strategic contexts, they invariably
emphasized the newness of the threats the nation faced, the inevitability of a
future attack, and the inordinate cost of waiting until the other side either
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attacked or attack was imminent.17  This history offers valuable lessons for our
own era.
This article will not revisit the arguments made for or against the legality
of the Iraq war, nor the Bush administration preemptive war doctrine that
justified it.  Rather, it will evaluate the administration’s arguments against the
backdrop of history.  Of course, the historical terrain is contested and fails to
provide definitive answers.  Context matters, and every strategic environment
presents new problems and challenges.  Nevertheless, the preventive war
arguments underlying the Iraq war have a rich and lengthy history that seems
highly relevant for both understanding the legal rules contained in the U.N.
Charter and assessing their continued relevance.
This article therefore uses history in a very different manner than that
customarily used by international legal scholars.  Rather than analyzing state
practice to determine the content of international law, history is used here to
understand the dangers of the administration’s doctrine and the reasons that
underlie its rejection by the framers of the U.N. Charter.  Legal norms
undoubtedly seek to encapsulate historical experience, and while the lessons
of history certainly can and have been misused, abused, and misunderstood,
history ought not to be simply ignored.  That the history speaks to the wisdom
of a particular sort of policy and not its legality ought not to lead to its legal
irrelevance, particularly in an era in which the applicable legal norms are
under assault as being inconsistent with national security requirements.18
Nor is the search for historical meaning in this area misguided because,
as one commentator has argued, a nation’s use of force occurs in “exceptional,
singular contexts,” in which each “specific set of circumstances” presents
different problems, and therefore, learning from experience may not play a
useful role.19  Whether that is true is better understood after an examination
of the historical record, to determine whether some general trends or
principles can, in fact, be discerned.
The first test of the administration’s newly-minted doctrine in Iraq has
undoubtedly been a disaster.20  By virtually all accounts, the war has made the
United States and the world less safe.21  The war was fought unnecessarily to
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destroy dangerous weapons that turned out to be nonexistent.22  The war has
created a terrorist haven in Iraq where none existed before, has cost thousands
of lives and billions of dollars, has sparked an insurgency that threatens to
spiral into full scale civil war, and has emboldened other “rogue states” by
sending a message to countries such as Iran and North Korea that they should
accelerate their development of weapons of mass destruction in order to deter
another “preventive” attack by the United States.23  But perhaps the
administration simply got it wrong and attacked the wrong country, for the
wrong reasons, at the wrong time.  While the debacle in Iraq ought to provide
a strong cautionary example for advocates of preventive war, it does not
necessarily disprove the utility or logic of other preventive attacks against
other governments viewed as rogue states.
Yet the history of preventive warfare outlined in this article illustrates
that often such wars prove to be both unnecessary and disastrous.
International law makes the judgment that it is better to avoid warfare unless
a nation is being attacked or facing imminent attack, or can convince the
Security Council that there is no other viable response to a serious threat to
peace but to use force.  The historical record of prior preventive wars and
United States policymakers’ discussions of proposed preventive wars during
the Cold War suggests that the judgment the law makes is reasonable.
I.  THE HISTORY OF PREVENTIVE WARFARE
The Bush administration presents its preventive war doctrine as a new
doctrine for a new world.24  The National Security Strategy states that after
September 11 we are living in a “new world,” where we “can no longer solely
rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past.”25  President Bush termed his
strategy a “new doctrine called pre-emption,”26 arguing that the war against
terrorism ushers in a “new paradigm.”27
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In one sense, the doctrine is new.  It is inconsistent with the rules set forth
in the U.N. Charter, which the United States had previously adhered to as a
matter of official policy, if not always in practice.28  As Secretary of State
Daniel Webster put it in 1842, preemptive self-defense is permitted only
where the threat is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no
moment of deliberation.”29  Until recently, the United States accepted this
imminence standard.  Thus, the Pentagon’s definition of lawful preemptive
self-defense echoed Webster’s:  “an attack initiated on the basis of
incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”30
The principle that individual nations may unilaterally use military force
against another nation only in self-defense is designed to reduce resort to war
by insisting on a bright line.31  An armed attack is an objective fact; an
imminent attack involves some amount of prediction, but is generally
understood to require objective evidence that the attack is indeed imminent,
such as the massing of troops at the border.32  The new Bush doctrine of “pre-
emption” departs from this bright-line rule and substitutes a theory more
accurately described as one of “preventive war” that permits the use of force
on the basis of a much more open-ended and less objectively verifiable
standard.33  According to the Pentagon, preventive war is “a war initiated in
the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to
delay would involve greater risk.”34  That description aptly fits the Iraq war,
as no administration official argued that Iraq had plans to attack the United
States or anybody else imminently.  Rather, the administration’s claims were
based on a calculation of inevitability or probability.  Deputy Secretary of
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State Richard Armitage asserted that rogue states’ “unrelenting drive to
possess weapons of mass destruction brings about the inevitability that they
will be used against us or our interests.”35
However, President Bush’s doctrine of preventive war is not new in that
it has a very ancient and sordid pedigree.  Just as the domestic use of
preventive detention to preempt perceived threats has had a troubled history,
so too, the use of preventive war to preempt external gathering dangers before
they come to pass has often had calamitous consequences.  The history of
Western civilization is filled with major wars commenced for preventive
reasons:  Sparta’s declaration of war against Athens commencing the
Peloponnesian War, Carthage’s preemptive attack on Rome, the preventive
war declared by Germany against Russia that initiated World War I, or
Japan’s surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor.36  Most of these
wars were launched by leaders who also perceived that the strategic
environment their nations faced was new, and required decisive action before
the new gathering threats inevitably eventuated.37
The framers of the U.N. Charter sought in 1945 to limit a nation’s
discretion to use force to prevent perceived dangers.  At the founding San
Francisco Conference of the U.N., the U.S. delegation introduced the language
which allowed for a right of self-defense only “if an armed attack occurs.”38
In response to concerns that this might limit the right of self-defense too
severely, a leader of the American delegation, Governor Harold Stassen,
replied that “this was intentional and sound. . . . We did not want exercised the
right of self-defense before an armed attack had occurred.”39
The U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force for any reason other
than self-defense stemmed from the world’s experience with preventive war
during World War I and World War II.  As political scientist David
Hendrickson observes, “[r]epugnance for preventive war became deeply
embedded in the world community because the use of that doctrine in the
twentieth century led to results nearly fatal to civilization.”40
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Many historians view World War I as a preventive war.41  On June 28,
1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austin was assassinated by a Serb
revolutionary in the Bosnian capital of Sarejevo.  A short five weeks later, the
major European powers were at war, a war in which ten million people were
killed, more than twice as many as had died in all the wars of the previous two
centuries.42  The war brought chaos and disorder to Europe, and ultimately led
to the dissolution of three great empires—the Russian, Austrian Hungarian
and Ottoman Empires.43
An important ideological and strategic cause of the war was the
increasing turn towards preventive war reasoning by all the great powers in
the first decades of the 20th century.44  This widespread acceptance of
preventive war doctrine, a consequence of the increasing fears wrought by the
rapid pace of technological and social change, was most pronounced in
Germany.45
Germany had not always been this way.  Forty years earlier, then German
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had strongly argued against the doctrine of
preventive war.  No dove, Bismarck was known for his leadership of Germany
during three wars leading to German unification and argued that great political
questions would be decided “by blood and iron.”46  Nonetheless, throughout
the 1870s and 1880s Bismarck urged a policy of caution and patience and
attempted to maintain friendly relations with Russia.  Bismarck repeatedly
opposed the policy of preventive war urged by military leaders such as Count
Waldersee, German Chief of Staff.47  Bismarck once characterized preventive
war as committing “suicide from fear of death,”48 and told Kaiser Wilhelm I
that:  “I would . . . never advise Your Majesty to declare war forthwith, simply
because it appeared that our opponent would begin hostilities in the near
future.  One can never anticipate the ways of divine providence securely
enough for that.”49  Nonetheless, by 1890, Bismarck was forced to resign, and
the strategy of preventive war became entrenched as German military
doctrine.
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By the turn of the 20th century, German military leaders had concluded
that preventive war was essential to the country’s long-term security.
Germany’s generals and some powerful civilian leaders came to believe that
war with France and Russia was inevitable, and that time was not on
Germany’s side because Russia’s rapid modernization of its armed forces
would soon render Germany incapable of defeating France and Russia in a
war.50  German Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke expressed the widely held
view at a high level meeting between Kaiser Wilhelm and military leaders in
December 1912 that “war is inevitable, and the sooner the better.”51
By the spring of 1914, Germany’s military and civilian leaders concluded
that the time was right to wage a preventive war.  Moltke calculated that
Germany only had “two or three years” before Russia’s national railway
network would be sufficiently developed so that rapid Russian mobilization
would thwart Germany’s ability to prevail against the French-Russian
alliance.52  The German military plan, developed by General Schlieffen in the
1890s, relied on a decisive, preemptive attack on France prior to Russian
mobilization on Germany’s largely unprotected eastern front.53  German
leaders believed that Russia’s rapid armament and technological development
put Germany in an untenable position.  On the eve of war, German Chancellor
Bethmann’s secretary and confidant wrote in his diary that “Russia’s military
power [is] growing rapidly; with the strategic extension [of Russian railways]
into Poland the situation is intolerable.”54  For the Chancellor and other
German leaders, the rapid growth of Russian military power created a specter
of “a heavier and heavier nightmare.”55  The climate of apprehension in
Germany before the war was summed up by Germany’s Foreign Secretary,
who wrote on May 29, 1914:
In two to three years, . . . [o]ur enemies’ military power would then be so great that
[Moltke] did not know how he could deal with it.  Now we were still more or less a
match for it.  In his view there was no alternative but to fight a preventive war so as to
beat the enemy while we could still emerge fairly well from the struggle.  The Chief of
Staff therefore put it to me that our policy should be geared to bringing about an early
war.56
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A Serbian assassin’s bullet provided the excuse, or in Moltke’s words,
“an effective slogan” for a preventive war that had already been planned.57  In
fact, there was little evidence that Russia and France had any plans to attack
Germany first.58  The preventive war paradigm led German officials such as
Chancellor Bethmann to take what he knew was “a calculated risk,” a “leap
in the dark.”59  The decision proved catastrophic, not only for Germany, but
for all of Europe.60
Hitler also justified Germany’s launching of World War II in preventive
terms.  In August 1939, he told an assembly of his top military commanders
that “we are faced with the hard alternative of either striking or the certainty
of being destroyed sooner or later.  I am only afraid that some Schwenekind
may submit a mediation plan at the last moment.”61  German attacks on
Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and eventually the Soviet Union were
all justified by Hitler as preventive moves.  After the war, in their testimony
before the Nuremberg tribunals, the top German military commanders argued
that Germany’s invasion of Russia was “undeniably a purely preventive war,”
undertaken “in order to prevent a definite aggression on the part of the
adversary,” and “the only way out” of the great threat posed by the Soviets.62
The founders of the U.N. also had a more recent illustration of the
dangers of preventive war:  Japan’s military strike at Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941.  The Japanese felt cornered by President Roosevelt’s
freezing of Japanese assets and the U.S. imposition of an oil embargo.63  They
believed war with the United States was inevitable, and that only by launching
a preemptive strike could they avoid defeat.  Vice Admiral Yamamoto,
Commander in Chief of the Japanese fleet, wrote in a private letter that “[i]n
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the event of outbreak of war with the United States, there would be little
prospect of our operations succeeding unless, at the very outset, we can deal
a crushing blow to the main force of the American fleet in Hawaiian waters
. . . .”64  The Japanese initially sought to negotiate a diplomatic resolution to
the crisis.  Nevertheless, when those negotiations proved fruitless, they
launched a preventive war.  For six months, the Japanese military had
unparalleled success; less than four years later, however, two million Japanese
were dead and Japanese cities lay smoldering in ruins.65
Preventive wars fought by nations to forestall “gathering threats” before
they eventuate have often had similar results.  The tragic Peloponnesian War
from 431 404 B.C., fought with unprecedented brutality and causing
widespread suffering and destruction, was a preventive war launched by
Sparta because of its fear of the threat posed by Athenian power.  Sparta faced
no immediate threat or direct harm from Athens.  Rather, Thucydides wrote
that “[w]hat made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the
fear which this caused in Sparta.”66
The Spartan debate over whether to launch a preventive war has a
surprisingly modern resonance.  Sparta’s ally, Corinth, criticized the Spartans
for their defensive mindset.  The Corinthians claimed that the Spartans were
the only Greek peoples who:
do nothing in the early stages to prevent an enemy’s expansion; you wait until your
enemy has doubled his strength . . . instead of going out to meet [the Athenians], you
prefer to stand still and wait until you are attacked, thus hazarding everything by fighting
with your opponents who have grown far stronger than they were originally.67
The Corinthians argued that Athens presented a new paradigm, a strategic
environment “completely different” from anything Sparta had previously
faced.68  To the Corinthians, Sparta’s:
whole way of life [was] out of date when compared with [the Athenians].  And it is just
as true in politics as it is in any act or craft:  new methods must drive out old ones.  When
a city can live in peace and quiet, no doubt the old-established ways are best:  but when
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one is constantly being faced by new problems, one has also to be capable of approaching
them in an original way.69
The “original way” was preventive war.
Spartan King Archidamus, who had a reputation for “intelligence and
moderation,” urged caution, however, because “it is impossible to foresee the
course that the war will take.”70  Archidamus argued that “[a]s for being slow
and cautious—which is the usual criticism made against us—there is nothing
to be ashamed of in that.”71  He accurately predicted that the war would not
“likely be small scale,” and would not “soon be over.”72  Arguing “that it is
impossible to calculate accurately events that are determined by chance,”73
Archidamus suggested that Sparta take a diplomatic course of action because
a preemptive attack would have been illegal.  He advised “sending a mission”
to the Athenians, claiming “this is the right thing to do since the Athenians
themselves are prepared to submit to arbitration, and when one party offers
this it is quite illegal to attack him first, as though he was definitely in the
wrong.”74  Archidamus did not urge appeasement or surrender, but advised
that Sparta prepare for the possibility of war while seeking peace.
Archidamus’ speech was answered by a Spartan leader, Sthenelaidas, who
passionately argued that “this is not a matter to be settled by lawsuits and by
words,” and called for quick action in support of Sparta’s allies, insisting, “Do
not allow the Athenians to grow still stronger.”75  The Spartans
overwhelmingly followed Sthenelaidas’ call for preventive war, despite the
fact that Athenian policy was not particularly aggressive, and Athens
represented no immediate threat to Sparta.76  Sparta’s allies voted a month
later for war, but not by a large majority.  As one scholar puts it “[a]mong the
allies, therefore, we may deduce that not everyone thought the war inevitable,
not everyone thought it was just, not everyone thought it would be easy and
successful, not everyone thought it was necessary.”77  The dissenters had it
right.
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The preventive thinking that led Sparta to war against Athens has also
played a prominent role in many of Europe’s most destructive and devastating
wars.  The war between Carthage and Rome in the 3rd century B.C. that led
to the destruction of Carthage “closely follows the preventive logic of the
Greek case.”78  Carthage, facing the rise of Rome’s power decided to launch
a preventive war before it was too late.  Hannibal’s famous march across the
Alps was initially successful, but Carthage wound up losing a devastating
war.79  So too, post-Westphalian Europe fought many a devastating,
destructive and unnecessary preventive war.  One study of the major wars in
Europe between the 16th and 20th century concludes that virtually all of them
were propelled by preventive motivations, in which a powerful but declining
state “engaged in a desperate race against time,” to defeat the growing danger,
which, it perceived, would inevitably overwhelm it.80  Another study found
that between 1848 and 1918, “[e]very war between Great Powers started as a
preventive war, not a war of conquest,” and all but one “brought disaster on
their originators.”81  Yet another analysis of centuries of European warfare
finds that “[p]reventive logic . . . is a ubiquitous motive for war.”82  In 1760,
Edmund Burke concluded that the military policy of preventing emerging
threats to the balance of power had been the source “of innumerable and
fruitless wars” in Europe.83
A source of many of these unnecessary and destructive conflicts was
exaggerated suspicions about other nations’ motives.84  Preventive war theory
permits nations to act based not simply on an objective, verifiable attack
against them, but on a suspicion that such an attack is inevitable in the future.
Often, the suspicions turn out to be ill-founded, as occurred in the recent Iraq
war.  One scholar of warfare concluded after an exhaustive study that the
“chief source of insecurity in Europe since modern times . . . lies in the
national tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with
counterproductive belligerence.”85  During the height of its power, Rome
always perceived itself as in danger of “being attacked by evil minded
neighbors, always fighting for breathing space,”86 and launched numerous
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wars motivated by fear and insecurity.  The Athenians launched the disastrous
Sicilian expedition of 415 because they believed that their security required
preventively attacking others and ruling over them to avoid “being subjected
to the rule of another party.”87  The great Swiss jurist Vattel recognized what
seems to be an all too common flaw in these preventive wars when he
concludes his discussion of the war fought by Great Britain and its allies
against what they believed was King Louis XIV’s “design” to dominate
Europe on a sobering note:  “it has since appeared that the policy [of the
Allies] was too suspicious.”88
The most destructive and devastating war in United States history also has
been viewed by some as a preventive war.  As the prominent Civil War
historian James McPherson has argued, Southern secession “was a preemptive
act to forestall the anticipated threat to slavery.”89  While Southern moderates
argued that they should wait for an “overt act,” proponents of secession
argued that the South could not afford to wait until the North sent forth more
terrorists like John Brown.  “If I find a coiled rattlesnake in my path,” asked
an Alabama editor, “do I wait for an overt act; or do I smite him in his coil?”90
A Mississippian stated the sentiments of many firebrands when he argued,
“[l]et us rally before the enemy can make good his promise to overwhelm us.
Delay is dangerous.  Now is the time to strike.”91  When Union forces
attempted to resupply Fort Sumter—with provisions, not military
reinforcements—the Confederates preempted that mission, and fired the shots
that started the Civil War.  “‘It was obvious,’ wrote Jefferson Davis, ‘that no
time was to be lost in . . . anticipating the impending assault’ by shooting
first.”92
Of course, not all preventive wars are failures.93  For example, Frederick
the Great’s preventive 18th century wars propelled the rise of modern
Germany.94  Caesar’s preventive wars were viewed by many Romans as
having been undertaken with slight or no provocation, and were seen as unjust
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and dangerous, but such objections were overcome because he was
enormously successful.95
Preventive war proponents also point, however, to the Israel 1981 attack
on Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak as a recent example of a preventive military
strike that made the world safer.96  Had Israel not knocked out the Iraqi
reactor, administration supporters argue, Saddam Hussein might have already
had the bomb by the time he invaded Kuwait.97  Israel’s clearly unlawful
military strike was unanimously condemned by the U.N. Security Council
despite Israeli arguments that were similar to, but in hindsight far stronger and
more accurate than, those made by the Bush administration in 2003.98  The
usually hawkish British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher denounced the
raid, stating that “[a]rmed attack in such circumstances cannot be justified.
It represents a grave breach of international law.”99  Both the Thatcher
government and the Reagan administration joined the Council’s strong
condemnation.  The Reagan administration invoked the Arms Export Control
Act, which delayed the delivery of arms it had previously contracted to sell to
Israel and required that arms supplied to Israel in the future be used for
defensive purposes only.100
Nonetheless, the international community imposed only minimal
sanctions against Israel, and Israel was able to destroy Iraq’s nuclear reactor
before it went on line.101  While the Israeli strike was certainly a serious short-
term setback to Iraq’s nuclear program, its overall success is dubious.  Iraq
salvaged about 25 kilograms of bomb grade uranium from the rubble,102 and
Saddam Hussein accelerated his efforts to develop a nuclear weapon.  Within
several years after the strike, Iraq had up to 20,000 technical workers,
including as many as 7,000 scientists and engineers, developing its nuclear
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weapons program and had expended approximately between $4 and $8 billion
on the work.103  Iraqi exile, nuclear scientist Khidir Hamza, told Paul Begala
on CNN that the Israeli strike created “a much larger danger in the longer
range.”104  Another Iraqi nuclear scientist, Imad Khadduri, claims that the
Osirak strike had the exact opposite effect than what Israel intended; it sent
Saddam Hussein’s A-Bomb program into “overdrive” and convinced the Iraqi
leadership to replace the relatively small facility that Israel had bombed with
a more massive, full-fledged nuclear program immediately afterwards.105  By
1988, after its war with Iran ended, Iraq embarked on building a new array of
nuclear facilities, but this time it dispersed and concealed them to prevent
another quick airstrike.  Indeed, the Osirak raid forced every state seeking
nuclear weapons to disperse and conceal its operations, leading one military
analyst to conclude that “[t]he days of Osiraq-type raids on a single, easily
located, and above-surface nuclear facility are over.”106  We now know that
Iraq, despite the Israeli raid, was perilously close to building a nuclear bomb
in 1990.  What prevented Iraq from building nuclear weapons was therefore
not the Osirak raid, but Hussein’s miscalculation in invading Kuwait.
Moreover, as Israel learned, the Osirak strike was hard to replicate.  When
Pakistan began developing its nuclear program in the 1980s, Israel approached
India to request landing and refueling rights for a proposed attack on
Pakistan’s Kahuta nuclear reactor.107  India, despite the grave threat Pakistan’s
program presented to its people, denied Israel’s requests, believing that
Kahuta would be very difficult to target and destroy and that Pakistan would
respond by attacking India’s nuclear facilities, an act that would likely result
in a full-scale war.108
Preventive war advocates also argue that history demonstrates that the
dangers of preventive action are often outweighed by the danger of not acting
to preempt a future threat.  They point to the 1938 Munich symbol of
appeasement where Britain and France abandoned Czechoslovakia to the
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Nazis as evidence that the risks of preventive war are counterbalanced by the
risks of inaction.109  Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld argue that
millions are dead because Britain and France failed to take preventive military
action to thwart the gathering Nazi threat in the 1930s.110  But the Munich
analogy is inapt, not only because it is ludicrous to claim that Saddam Hussein
posed a similar military threat to the United States as did Hitler to Europe in
1938.  More fundamentally, Britain and France did not need a doctrine of
preventive war to use military force to stop Hitler’s military actions against
the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia.  In those instances, they would
have been acting to stop armed attacks or imminently threatened attacks, not
speculative gathering dangers that might only materialize in the future.
Indeed, the real lesson of Munich is the lack of political will in Britain and
France to forge a strong multilateral alliance with the Soviet Union to stand
up to Hitler, which might have avoided war and led to Hitler’s downfall within
Germany.  Indeed, such a strong defensive alliance, not preventive war, was
the policy Churchill unsuccessfully advocated in the 1930.111
While one must be cautious about drawing conclusive lessons from
contested history, the evidence supports the decision of the drafters of the
U.N. Charter to reject preventive war.112  First, the preventive rationale has
often been a pretext masking an aggressive intent.  The Nazis’ reliance on
preventive-war thinking, for example, was plainly a pretext for aggression.
Second, the preventive rationale has often led countries to be overeager
to initiate what have turned out to be “fruitless” military campaigns.  Many
preventive wars have been launched on the deeply felt, but often erroneous
perception that war was inevitable, and that a new threat had created a new
strategic environment requiring bold, decisive action.  While some preventive
wars may have been necessary, and sometimes nations should have fought
when instead they waited for the threat to materialize, the prominent scholar
of the history of warfare, Columbia professor Robert Jervis, concluded that,
“on balance, it seems that states are more likely to overestimate the hostility
of others then to underestimate it.”113
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Third, many preventive wars have been initiated, like the Iraq War, under
the illusion that they would be short.  That illusion fundamentally skews the
cost-benefit analysis that a nation undertakes in deciding whether to launch a
war.  Rather than leading to quick, relatively costless victories, most
preventive wars have had disastrous results.  War is of course always costly,
in lives and resources, but a preventive war is at least potentially an avoidable
war.  If the aggressor nation miscalculates and the nation it attacks was not in
fact preparing to attack it, then the war is unnecessary.  Wars undertaken in
self-defense, by contrast, are almost by definition unavoidable.
Fourth, this history suggests that we should be suspicious of arguments
that we are in a “new world,”114 facing “a threat with no precedent”115 and that
we should abandon the old rules in favor of a “new doctrine,” or “new
paradigm.”116  The use of an invocation of a new threat without precedent to
argue that we should abandon the old legal rules is itself not new, and the
argument ignores the fact that the rule against unilateral preventive warfare
developed in large part in response to the world’s generally disastrous
experience of launching wars to prevent perceived new and unprecedented
threats.  That experience led the U.N. to adopt the principle that unilateral
wars could be undertaken only in self-defense, in response to an armed
attack.117  In recognition of the historic dangers of preventive war, the Charter
imposes institutional restraints that permit resort to such warfare only when
a state can convince the Security Council that such a war is necessary.118
II.  THE COLD WAR AND PREVENTIVE WAR THOUGHT IN THE
UNITED STATES
These same lessons of history have informed U.S. war policy at least
since World War II, although not without debate.  During the Cold War, U.S.
policymakers continually grappled with arguments for preventive war
remarkably similar to those made today.119
The ink was barely dry on the U.N. Charter when the world irrevocably
and dramatically changed.  Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki created a “paradigm shift” in
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which government officials faced an unprecedented challenge not anticipated
by the framers of the U.N. Charter.  That challenge was at least as new and as
daunting in their time as the danger posed by terrorists is today.
Between 1945 and 1949, the United States maintained a monopoly on
atomic weapons, but the Soviet Union clearly was determined to break that
monopoly.120  While some in the Truman administration urged that we share
our atomic secret with the Soviets and develop a co-operative approach to
nuclear weapons, a number of high level U.S. officials, particularly within the
military and defense department, favored a policy of preventive war.121  Their
argument, strikingly similar to those made for preventive war against Iraq and
other rogue states, was that the Soviets were led by a brutal, paranoid, and
aggressive dictator bent on world domination and that upon reaching atomic
parity with the United States, the Soviets would inevitably launch a surprise
attack against us.122  Therefore, a better alternative was to launch a war to
prevent them from obtaining nuclear weapons, rather than delay until it was
too late.  As early as January 1946, General Leslie Groves, the wartime head
of the Manhattan Project, raised the desirability of preventive war.  “If we
were ruthlessly realistic,” he wrote,
we would not permit any foreign power with which we are not firmly allied, and in which
we do not have absolute confidence, to make or possess atomic weapons. . . . If such a
country started to make atomic weapons we would destroy its capacity to make them
before it had progressed far enough to threaten us.123
General Orvil Anderson, the commandant of the Air War College, agreed with
Groves that the changed nature of war meant that an “overt act of war has
been committed by an enemy when [it] builds [weapons] intended for our
eventual destruction” and therefore, destroying those weapons “before [they]
can be launched or employed is defensive action and not aggression.”124
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Indeed, preventive war logic was quite common not only among military
officials, but also among civilian leaders, who believed that war with the
Soviets was inevitable and that sooner was better than later.125  Many agreed
with William L. Laurence, a science correspondent for the New York Times
and America’s leading writer on nuclear issues, when he wrote in 1948 that
Soviet “insistence on an atomic-armament race . . . must inevitably lead to
war,” and that “it would be to our advantage to [fight] it while we are still the
sole possessors of the atomic bomb.”126  Laurence argued that we should
present the Soviets with an ultimatum to dismantle their atomic plants, and if
they refused, destroy their plants before the bombs could be produced.127
Senator Brian McMahon, the influential Chairman of the Joint Committee of
Atomic Energy, favored the idea, arguing that “almost nothing could be worse
than the current atomic armaments race.”128  Influential intellectuals such as
Bertrand Russell and the famous physicist Leo Szilard supported preventive
war arguments, as did noted mathematicians such as John Williams, a leading
figure at the RAND Corporation, and John von Neumann, the founder of game
theory.129  Von Neumann was a particularly strong advocate, remarking in
1950 that “[i]f you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today?
If you say today at 5 o’clock, I say why not one o’clock?”130
While preventive war thinking found support in both military and civilian
circles, it was especially strong within the Defense Department.  Some
military officials made the identical argument that Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld makes today.  They asserted that the new “complexion of atomic
war reemphasizes the old cliché that the best defense is a good offense and
alters it somewhat:  [T]he best defense is the first offense in force.”131
Similarly, the argument that the atomic era rendered surprise attacks
indefensible by traditional defensive means surfaced in 1947 in a report by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating reorientation of national military strategy to
permit preventive war.132  The report urged America to revise its
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traditional attitudes toward what constitute acts of aggression so that our armed forces
may plan and operate in accordance with the realities of atomic warfare.  Our policy of
national defense must provide for the employment of every practical means to prevent
surprise attack.  Offensive measures will be the only generally effective means of defense,
and the United States must be prepared to employ them before a potential enemy can
inflict significant damage upon us.133
In August 1950, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews openly urged
the United States to adopt a “character new to a true democracy—an initiator
of a war of aggression—it would win for us a proud and popular title—we
would become the first aggressors for peace.”134  “The United States should
be willing to pay any price to achieve a world at peace,” Matthews
proclaimed, “even the price of instituting a war to compel cooperation for
peace.”135  Matthews’ speech, which was believed to be a trial balloon
launched at the behest of his boss, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson,136 was
followed less than a week later by an even more explosive public statement by
General Orville Anderson, commandant of the Air War College.137  Anderson
told a columnist for the Montgomery Advertiser that he favored a preventive
war to destroy the incipient Soviet nuclear facilities:
“Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia’s five A-bomb nests in a week,”
he said.  “And when I went to Christ, I think I could explain to Him why I wanted to do
it now before it’s too late.  I think I could explain to Him that I had saved civilization.
With it [the A-bomb] used in time, we can immobilize a foe [and prevent] his crime
before it happened.”138
President Truman, however, decisively rejected a policy of preventive
war.  He personally chastised Matthews and fired Anderson the day after his
interview was reported.139  “We do not believe in aggressive or preventive
war,” Truman said in a radio broadcast the next day, “[s]uch war is the
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weapon of dictators, not of free democratic countries like the United
States.”140
By 1949, the Soviets had exploded their first atomic weapon, which, in
the words of Dean Acheson “changed everything.”141  The Truman
administration undertook a comprehensive review of United States military
policy.  The results of that review were set forth in NSC-68, which described
the Soviets as being driven by “a new fanatic faith that seeks to impose its
absolute authority over the rest of the world.”142  NSC-68 rejected the views
of those like George Kennan who advocated negotiations with the Soviets, in
favor of a rapid, massive military build-up of both conventional forces and
nuclear forces through the construction of new super atomic, hydrogen bombs.
The militaristic policy urged by NSC-68 and adopted by Truman required
massive military spending heretofore unheard of in peacetime.
Despite its strongly militaristic recommendations, NSC-68 explicitly
considered and rejected preventive war.  It offered three reasons for doing so.
First, it would not work.  A U.S. atomic attack on the U.S.S.R. “would not
force or induce the Kremlin to capitulate and . . . the Kremlin would still be
able to use the forces under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia.”143
Second, a preventive attack “would be repugnant to many Americans,” leading
to domestic opposition.144  Third, U.S. allies, particularly in Western Europe,
would also oppose such a war, harming U.S. relations with them and making
it “difficult after such a war to create satisfactory international order.”145  The
conclusion was that the United States should not launch an attack unless
attacked or facing imminent attack:  “These considerations are no less weighty
because they are imponderable, and they rule out an attack unless it is
demonstrably in the nature of a counter-attack to a blow which is on its way
or about to be delivered.”146
Despite Anderson’s firing and the NSC-68’s rejection of preventive war,
many U.S. generals and other high level military officials continued to support
the concept in private.  Within several years, the Eisenhower administration
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revisited the arguments for preventive war.  In an August 1953 memorandum
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Nathan Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff
and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued for a preventive war
prior to the Soviet’s development of nuclear weapons sufficient to destroy us:
We must recognize this time of decision, or, we will continue blindly down a suicidal
path and arrive at a situation in which we will have entrusted our survival to the whims
of a small group of proven barbarians.  If we believe it unsafe, unwise, or immoral to
gamble that the enemy will tolerate our existence under this circumstance, we must be
militarily prepared to support such decisions as might involve general war.147
In 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized what they viewed as the essentially
reactive and defensive nature of U.S. policy, urging that a policy of an
“unmistakenly positive quality” be adopted.148  As Joint Chiefs of Staff
(“J.C.S.”) Chairman Radford explained to the National Security Council in
November 1954, “if we continue the policy of forestalling Communist action,
we cannot hope for anything but a showdown with Soviet Communists by
1959 or 1960.”  Victory in a nuclear war could be guaranteed only if it
occurred “prior to Soviet achievement of atomic plenty.”149  In May 1954, the
J.C.S. Advance Study Group briefed President Eisenhower on a proposal that
the United States consider “‘deliberately precipitating war with the U.S.S.R.
in the near future,’ before Soviet thermonuclear capability became a ‘real
menace.’”150
President Eisenhower decisively rejected the argument for preventive
war, as had Truman.  Eisenhower’s Army Chief of Staff, Matthew Ridgeway,
denounced the policy as “contrary to every principle upon which our Nation
had been founded,” and “abhorrent to the great mass of American people.”151
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that containment was working,
adding sarcastically, “even if it hasn’t got us into a war.”152  While Eisenhower
himself had raised in a 1953 private memo to Dulles, the thought that the
continued arms race might “either drive us to war . . . or into some form of
dictatorial government[,]” forcing us to consider whether “to initiate war at
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the most propitious moment that we could designate.”153  However, he
decisively rejected the idea of preventive war:
All of us have heard this term “preventive war” since the earliest days of Hitler . . . . A
preventive war, to my mind, is an impossibility today . . . . I don’t believe there is such
a thing; and frankly, I wouldn’t even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked
about such a thing.154
When asked later by Washington Post journalist Chalmers Roberts whether
he was opposed to preventive war only for “military reasons,” Eisenhower
responded that “[t]here are all sorts of reasons, moral and political and
everything else, against this theory, but it is so completely unthinkable in
today’s conditions that I thought it is no use to go any further.”155
An updated Basic National Security Policy approved by Eisenhower in
late 1954 and early 1955 stated unequivocally that “[t]he United States and its
allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke
war.”156  The rejection of preventive war remained official U.S. policy
throughout the Cold War.  As Professor Bernard Brodie, the preeminent
national security scholar of the 1940s and ’50s, wrote, “[t]he people of the
United States have obviously made a decision, with little overt debate but
quite remarkable unanimity, against any form of preventive war . . . . [A]
decision . . . which accords profoundly with our national psychology and
system of values.”157  Even future Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
concurred, dismissing the idea of preventive war in 1955 with the comment
that “[t]here has always been an air of unreality about a program so contrary
to the sense of the country and the constitutional limits within which
American foreign policy must be conducted.”158
Brodie may have been over-optimistic about Americans’ inherent sense
of values.  In the late 1940s, polls indicated that 70 percent of the American
people supported the first use of atomic weapons and preventive war.159
However, by the mid 1950s, only 13 percent agreed in a Gallup Poll with the
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view that we should launch a preventive war against the Soviet Union while
we had the advantage in atomic weapons.160
The closest the United States ever came to launching a preventive war
against the Soviet Union or its allies during the Cold War came in the Cuban
Missile Crisis.  The Bush administration invokes President Kennedy’s
handling of that crisis as precedent for its policy of preventive war.  “Think
of John F. Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Secretary of State Donald
Rumsfeld argues.  “He didn’t sit there and let Soviets put missiles in Cuba and
fire a nuclear missile at the United States; he decided to engage in preemptive
action, preventative action, anticipatory self defense, call it what you wish.
And he went out and blockaded them . . . . And prevailed because he did take
preventive action.”161
However, Rumsfeld’s invocation of Kennedy is inapt for two critical
reasons.  First, Kennedy explicitly rejected the option of a preventive military
strike against Cuba, despite the urgings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and many
of his civilian advisors.162  Instead, Kennedy authorized a minimal use of
force, the quarantine or blockade, with the resolve to seek a diplomatic, not
a military solution to the crisis.163  That diplomatic resolution involved
substantial concessions, including an agreement not to invade Cuba, a promise
that provoked severe criticism from the President’s conservative critics.164
The Cuban Missile Crisis began with the type of strategic threat that had
led to many a preventive war in the past:  action by an inferior military power,
in this case the Soviet Union, to challenge the United States’ overwhelming
dominance in intercontinental range nuclear weapons, by placing nuclear
weapons 90 miles from U.S. territory.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff and many
civilian advisors, including Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Max Taylor,
former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon,
argued for immediate airstrikes to destroy the nuclear missile sites in Cuba,
followed by preparations for invasion.165  At first, the President appeared to
lean toward quick military action.  The probability of military success was
thought to be high.  America’s nuclear and conventional military supremacy
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in the Caribbean meant that there was little chance for the Soviets or Cubans
to defend the island.
Nevertheless, such military action could easily have led to all out war,
and the President sought an option that “lessen[ed] the chances of a nuclear
exchange which obviously is the final failure.”166  In addition, the President
and his advisors were reportedly influenced by the argument that a preventive
attack would be analogous to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and,
therefore, as Undersecretary of State George Ball argued, “contrary to our
traditions . . . directly thwart [what] we have stood for during our national
history,” and perhaps, most tellingly, would “condemn us as hypocrites in the
opinion of the world.”167  Robert Kennedy referred in various meetings to the
Pearl Harbor analogy, passing a note to his brother at the very first executive
meeting discussing a preemptive airstrike, “I now know how Tojo felt when
he was planning Pearl Harbor.”168  At a crucial meeting on September 19,
1962, Robert Kennedy made what historian Donald Kagan views as a
“decisive intervention” in the debate.169  The young Attorney General made
clear that the President rejected the airstrike option, stating that he had spoken
with him that morning and later recounted:
he thought it would be very difficult indeed for the President if the decision were to be
for an air strike, with all the memory of Pearl Harbor and with all the implications this
would have for us in whatever world there would be afterward.  For 175 years we had not
been that kind of country.170
When President Kennedy met with his advisors the next day, he confirmed
that he had decided on the blockade and had ruled out immediate military
action, calling it “the only course compatible with American principles.”171
Thus, Kennedy essentially rejected the notion of a preventive attack in
favor of a quarantine aimed toward diplomatic resolution.  Most observers
believe that even had Khrushchev declined to remove the missiles
immediately, Kennedy would have offered the dismantling of U.S. missiles in
Turkey for the dismantling of Soviet missiles in Cuba (a proposal that
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Kennedy did agree to privately) or would have tightened the naval blockade,
but would not have proceeded with air strikes against Cuba.172
In the end, Khrushchev backed down and removed the missiles from
Cuba, but only with a public promise from the Kennedy administration not to
invade Cuba and a secret, private agreement to remove U.S. missiles from
Turkey.  As Abram Chayes, a State Department official during the crisis, later
noted, the trade of Cuban for Turkish missiles meant that the crisis was
resolved by a decision to “in part, buy ’em out,” a fact “talked about much less
. . . because of the power of the Munich stigma and because it sounds a lot less
courageous.”173  McGeorge Bundy, one of the hawks in Kennedy’s inner
circle, said immediately after the resolution of the crisis that “this was the day
of the doves,”174 while Air Force Chief Curtis LeMay, a strong supporter of
preventive war, angrily called the agreement between Khrushchev and
Kennedy, “the greatest defeat in our history.”175  The Cuban Missile Crisis,
then, provides no support whatsoever for advocates of preventive invasions
of the sort launched against Iraq.
Indeed, President Kennedy’s actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis
expose the false dichotomy between action and inaction that permeates so
much of the Bush administration’s rhetoric in support of preventive war.  As
Robert Kennedy argued, the choice was not between a preemptive strike and
inaction.  Kennedy “favored action” to make known unmistakably the
seriousness of the United States’ determination to get the missiles out of Cuba,
but it was action that left room for a diplomatic solution, as opposed to
launching a war.176  In hindsight, it is hard to see how America would be safer
had Kennedy followed the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs and launched
a preventive attack.
The second important difference between Kennedy’s approach to the
Cuban Missile Crisis and Bush’s position is that Kennedy did not seek to
justify his actions with a new doctrine of preventive self-defense.  Instead, the
Kennedy administration repeatedly and consciously rejected reliance on self-
defense, despite the urgings of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach that international law could
be read in the atomic age to permit a self-defense justification.177  The reason
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that the Kennedy administration avoided reliance on preventive self-defense
was best explained by Abram Chayes, the legal advisor to the State
Department during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Chayes accepted that the notion
of self-defense included an anticipatory response to an imminent attack.  But
to permit preventive self-defense where there is no threatened imminent
attack, he maintained, would mean that “[t]here is simply no standard against
which this decision could be judged.  Whenever a nation believed that its
interests, which in the heat and pressure of a crisis it is prepared to
characterize as vital, were threatened, its use of force in response would
become permissible.”178
Instead of self-defense, the administration explicitly rested its argument
for the quarantine on the Organization of American States’ (OAS) approval
of the action, which Robert Kennedy later said transformed the U.S. position
“from that of an outlaw acting in violation of international law into a country
acting in accordance with twenty allies legally protecting their position.”179
Whether Kennedy was correct that the OAS approval provided legal
justification for the blockade has been disputed; what is indisputable is that
Kennedy eschewed the doctrine of preventive self-defense.
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations also briefly considered
preventive war against China in the 1960s.  President Kennedy and his
National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, believed that Chinese
possession of nuclear weapons would be intolerable because Mao Tse Tung
would be emboldened to commit blackmail and aggression.180  Kennedy
reportedly felt that a successful Chinese nuclear test was likely to be “the most
significant and worst event of the 1960s.”181  The influential columnist Stewart
Alsop argued in the Saturday Evening Post that the “madness of Mao Tse-
Tung” required military action against Beijing’s nuclear program, which he
characterized as a “technically easy problem” that could be accomplished with
a “few rather small bangs.”182  A lengthy article in the National Review argued
that a preemptive strike on Chinese nuclear installations could be warranted
in the future, and that such a strike could be justified “as a unique response to
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a unique situation not yet covered by international law[,]” the same
justification offered by the Bush administration for its new doctrine.183
Kennedy’s advisor, McGeorge Bundy claims that there was talk in
Washington about the possibility of preemptive action against the Chinese
bomb, but that it was only talk, not serious planning or real intent.184
Historians have been skeptical about Bundy’s claim, arguing that newly
declassified documents show that Kennedy and his advisors did more than
talk.185  Nonetheless, President Johnson subsequently rejected proposals for
preventive strikes against China as both unwise and impractical.186
Finally, in several instances involving Libya and North Korea, the United
States threatened military action against facilities that the it believed could
produce chemical or nuclear weapons.187  While the United States apparently
threatened North Korea with such action, President Clinton’s top military and
civilian advisors decided against actually launching such an attack in the event
North Korea did not back down.  Their reasoning was that although the
immediate objective of destroying the North Korean nuclear facilities could
have been easily achieved, a preemptive attack might well have triggered a
second Korean war, in which hundreds of thousands of lives would have been
lost.188  In any event, both North Korea and Libya backed down and in neither
of these instances did the threat eventuate.
President Bush has argued that today we face a threat with no precedent,
and that therefore, history is less relevant.189  However, the history of
preventive war demonstrates that President Bush is not alone in this
assessment; nations that launch preventive wars invariably perceive that they
are faced with some unprecedented threat which they believe will inevitably
destroy them unless decisive, forceful action is taken immediately.190  The
hazardous unpredictability of that judgment is no less true today; no indication
exists that the war against terrorism has sharpened humans’ ability to predict
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the future.  Moreover, as has been shown, proposals to launch preventive wars
against evil, maniacal dictators seen as driven to destroy us, and who possess
or are seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction are not new.  Stalin and
Mao were viewed in their day as no less paranoid monsters than Saddam
Hussein is today.  Nevertheless until the recent war with Iraq, no U.S.
administration had launched such a preventive war.
The administration also claims that while deterrence worked during the
Cold War where we faced a “generally status quo, risk-averse adversary,” the
“threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more
willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth
of their nation.”191  Yet during the late 1940s and early 1950s when preventive
war thought in the United States was most prevalent, most military or civilian
leaders would not have described Stalin’s Soviet Union or Mao’s China as
“generally status-quo, risk averse adversary.”  It is only in hindsight that we
now know that deterrence worked during the Cold War, just as we now know
that Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction threatening us or his
neighbors.  The historical record demonstrates that nations often misjudge
their adversaries’ intentions and launch wars because they assume that their
adversaries are unwilling to preserve the status quo and have aggressive
designs against them..
Finally, it may well be that the primary reason that the Truman,
Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations refused to launch
preemptive strikes against the Soviet Union and China was not for moral,
ethical, or legal reasons, but because of the serious danger of triggering
nuclear destruction or a major war.  But this in turn demonstrates the
bankruptcy of the preventive war doctrine.  Preventive war is especially
unwise against a foe that is really a serious threat and has the capability of
involving the United States in a lengthy and destructive conflict.  In other
words, the doctrine is least likely to be used where its use would be most
theoretically justified:  against those countries that most threaten us.  The risks
presented by such a conflict would seem to eliminate preventive war as an
option against the very nations President Bush has identified as rogue states,
such as Iran, North Korea, or Cuba, and certainly would rule out preventive
war against any nation State that actually possesses significant weapons of
mass destruction like Pakistan.  Indeed, even in Iraq, which had no weapons
of mass destruction, it turns out that preventive war is much messier, lengthy,
and destructive than our leaders ever imagined.
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That the United Stated rejected the preventive war doctrine during the
Cold War is not to suggest that our government always followed international
law during that era.  The United States and the Soviet Union repeatedly
violated the U.N. Charter’s prohibitions on the use of force; the Soviet
invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan and the U.S.
invasions of Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Libya, and Panama
are just a few examples.  Nonetheless, both the United States and the Soviet
Union maintained a formal fealty to the principle that force not be used
unilaterally except in self-defense to an attack or imminent attack.  While both
nations sought to expand the self-defense exception, defining the concept of
armed attack broadly to include aid a state provides to insurgents in an allied
nation, or asserting an expansive right to protect nationals abroad, both
superpowers had an interest in the stability of the formal rules stemming from
World War II.  Neither desired the destabilizing effects that openly
challenging the Charter rule would bring.192
The end of the Cold War demise of the Soviet Union has left us with
enormous, unchallenged power.  It is in significant part that dominant power
that made it possible for the Bush administration to adopt preventive-war
strategies that were repeatedly rejected during the Cold War.  As conservative
columnist Charles Krauthammer points out, what is “new is what happened
not on 9/11 but ten years earlier on December 26, 1991:  the emergence of the
United States as the world’s unipolar power.”193  The adoption of the
preventive war strategy is a reflection of that unchallenged power.  That
dominance is likely to keep preventive war as a policy option for future
administrations—whether they be Democratic or Republican.194
But we should resist that option.  By threatening to attack countries that
have neither attacked us nor threatened an attack, the Bush administration has
ignored the historical dangers of preventive war that undermine the rule of law
and our security.
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CONCLUSION
The United Nations Charter prohibition on nation’s International Law’s
judgment that it is better to avoid warfare unless a nation either has no choice
but to defend itself from an attack or imminent attack, or can convince a
majority of nations on the Security Council that another nation presents such
a clear danger and threat that an internationally sanctioned war should be
fought on behalf of the community of nations.  The historical experience
described in this essay cannot prove the validity of that judgment made by
international law, but it does provide evidence supporting that judgment.  So
too does our war against Iraq, in which government leaders repeated the
experience of many prior preventive wars, exaggerating the risk posed by the
other nation and underestimating the costs of war.
Some scholars, such as Professors Michael Glennon and John Yoo, have
argued that history also demonstrates that the Security Council has proven to
be a failure, undermined by repeated violations of its prohibitions on the use
of force.195  To them, this historical failure of the Security Council undermines
the Charter’s legal regime.
In fact, the Security Council performed its functions in the Iraq case as it
was designed to do.  The Council imposed a strict inspection process on
Iraq.196  The inspectors set about their work and were unable to find any Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction.  The Council accordingly determined that the
inspections should continue.  The Council’s judgment accurately reflected the
overwhelming international consensus.  In the end, the United States was not
even able to muster a majority vote to approve a resolution that could be read
as authorizing war.  Even countries usually allied with the United States, such
as Mexico, Chile, Germany and France, refused to authorize preventive war.197
The Security Council performed its task admirably, seeking to resolve the
dispute peacefully.  But against the will of the Security Council and most of
the world, the United States and Great Britain attacked Iraq anyway.  That is
Glennon and Yoo’s main point:  the lessons of history demonstrate that strong
nations simply do not accept legal or institutional restraints on their power to
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use force to protect what they consider their own vital interests.  As
Thucydides put it more than two thousand years ago, “the strong do what they
can and the weak suffer what they must.”198
Glennon and Yoo’s reading of history leads them to conclude that a stable
international order does not depend primarily on the rule of law, but, as Yoo
puts it, on “hegemonic stability.”  Preventive military action launched by a
hegemonic power or a group of nations to maintain peace may benefit all
nations.  The international system “should promote conduct that encourages
stability-enhancing uses of force, rather than seeking to reach a zero level of
violence, as current rules do.”199  Both Yoo and Glennon point to the 19th
century British example, where the British Navy, twice as large as its nearest
competitor, ruled the high seas, and used force aggressively and unilaterally
to protect the freedom of the seas, allowing maritime transport and commerce
to flourish.200
The world today is therefore grappling with two contradictory lessons
from history.  The first emphasizes the dangers of preventive war, while the
second emphasizes the difficulty of developing institutional and legal checks
on nations’ resort to warfare.  Yet despite the mixed record of the United
Nations in controlling warfare and the gloomy predictions for its future made
by some scholars and administration officials, the world simply cannot afford
to abandon the United Nations’ goal of preventing the scourge of war.  The
history of wars fought for ostensibly preventive reasons provides strong
support for maintaining the Charter’s rules.
